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Performing Rebellion: Karaoke as a 
Lens into Political Violence  
 
In explaining political violence, Conflict and Security Studies commonly focuses on 
the rational decision-making of elites. In contrast, this article considers the everyday 
aspirations of rebel grassroots. Understanding their lifeworlds is important as their 
interaction with rebel elites shapes the collective trajectories of revolutionary 
movements and, thus, wider dynamics of war and peace. This article analyzes the 
social practice of revolutionary karaoke music in Myanmar’s Kachin rebellion as a 
window into these hidden social dynamics of political violence. It does so by merging 
a relational reading of rebel figurations with a visual ethnographic methodology that 
moves beyond the textual study of propaganda lyrics. Instead, it analyzes the audio-
visual aesthetics and social practices of revolutionary karaoke. This critical mode of 
enquiry reveals the emotional dimension of rebellion, i.e. its appeal to affect rather 
than reason. It also suggests that revolutionary cultural artefacts can be more than just 
instrumental propaganda vehicles for instilling elite ideologies into un-agential masses. 
Indeed, the article shows that many young Kachin are not just passive consumers of 
propaganda. In karaoke bars and music studios, they actively perform rebellion. In so 
doing, they co-produce their own rebel subjectivities and rebel political culture at large. 
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“Wow, wow, yeah. Our nation, our suffering, shall be recognized among the nations 
in the world,” raps a young man in the uniform of the rebel Kachin Independence 
Army (KIA). He is swaying his Kalashnikov to the relaxed reggae rhythm of a band 
playing on a green riverbank in a music video on Laiza TV. The television station 
broadcasts from the small KIA-held town of Laiza in northern Myanmar’s restive 
Kachin State. With thousands of followers worldwide, the station’s Facebook page 
draws a global audience. Besides screening news on the ongoing armed conflict 
between the Myanmar’s armed forces and the ethnonational KIA, music videos are a 
staple on Laiza TV. Many of them feature the lyrics as running subtitles to help with 
singing along. This is convenient for a favorite pastime among young Kachin people: 
karaoke.  
This article analyzes karaoke as a window into political violence by looking at 
the lifeworlds and aspirations of non-elite rebel supporters in order to recalibrate the 
elite-centric and rationalist gaze of Conflict and Security Studies. This is important for 
developing a better understanding of the ways in which grassroots supporters shape 
the collective trajectories of revolutionary movements. The article seeks to do so 
through a relational lens that appreciates how social interdependencies develop a 
momentum of their own in driving political violence. In order to uncover these hidden 
social dynamics of political violence, this article moves beyond a textual analysis of 
revolutionary karaoke lyrics. Merging audio-visual methodology with findings from 
ethnographic fieldwork, it focuses instead on the audio-visual aesthetics of 
revolutionary music and the social practice of karaoke, which is popular among many 
young Kachin in Myanmar. This critical mode of enquiry reveals the emotional 
dimension of rebellion, i.e. its appeal to affect rather than reason. It also demonstrates 
that revolutionary music can be more than an instrumental propaganda vehicle for 
instilling elite ideologies into un-agential masses. Instead, I argue that many young 
Kachin actively co-produce their own subjectivities and rebel political culture by 
performing rebellion in karaoke bars and independently producing music videos. This, 
in turn, shapes the wider trajectory of political violence.  
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To develop these arguments, the article proceeds as follows: It first draws on 
the recent literature on rebel governance and introduces the sociology of Norbert Elias 
to propose a relational understanding of rebellion. It then suggests a conversation 
between Visual International Politics and ethnographic methodology to study rebel 
karaoke as a window into the social dynamics of political violence. Based on that, the 
article will discuss the performance of revolutionary identities in karaoke bars and the 
coproduction of rebel political culture in music studios of war-torn northern Myanmar.  
Rebellion as Social Figuration 
Ranajit Guha analyzed how generations of historians inferred the motivations and 
dynamics of peasant uprisings in colonial India from the “prose of counter-insurgency” 
(Guha 1988, 84): primary sources produced, processed and archived by the British Raj. 
Because an alternative first-hand account by the rebels themselves is missing, the logic 
of rebellion can only be interpreted through the lens of counterinsurgency (Guha 1988, 
70). Guha writes that the historiographic discourse produced on rebellion in colonial 
India, therefore:  
“amounts to an act of appropriation which excludes the rebel as the 
conscious subject of his own history and incorporates the latter as 
only a contingent element in another history with another subject 
[…]. And since the discourse is, in this particular instance, one about 
properties of the minds – about attitudes, beliefs, ideas, etc. rather 
than about externalities which are easier to identify and describe, 
the task of representation is made even more complicated than 
usual.” (Guha 1988, 77) 
Much academic knowledge produced on past and present rebellion suffers from the 
same problem. While rebels are central actors in civil wars, their own accounts and 
social lifeworlds are rarely captured in the field of Conflict and Security Studies. This 
seems to be the case for two reasons. First, it might often not be feasible or convenient 
to listen to the first-hand accounts of rebel members and affiliates. Second, scholars 
view rebels as particularly untruthful sources of information. According to Paul 
Collier, for instance, asking rebels about their own motivations is pointless since their 
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own accounts are little more than propaganda. In order “to discover the truth” one 
needed to employ formal modelling on the basis of statistical data (Collier 1999, 1–2). 
Collier’s binary intellectual construct between “greed” and “grievances” has long been 
refuted on empirical, theoretical, methodological and normative grounds (e.g. Cramer 
2002; Malešević 2008). Its underlying methodological individualism remains, 
however, deeply engrained in the study of political violence. In fact, large parts of 
Security Studies rely on presumably objective sources, such as the formal modelling of 
statistical data, to infer the motivations of rebels (e.g. Fearon 2004, Seymour 2014).  
Insofar as scholarship is interested in the rebel perspective, it mostly focuses on 
the rational calculus of rebel leaders (e.g. Pearlman 2009, Cunningham, Bakke, and 
Seymour 2012). Rank-and-file rebels have hitherto received little attention. In order to 
account for the collective trajectories of rebel movements, understanding the 
perspectives of non-elite rebels, however, seems pivotal. While the grassroots of a 
movement does not consciously direct or intend to direct the conduct of the collective, 
elites’ dependencies on their support makes them an important part of the rebel power 
equation (Staniland 2014; Brenner 2017). As per James Scott, “doing justice to radical 
movements requires not only the analysis of the ideas and activities of radical elites 
but also the recovery of the popular aspirations which made them possible” (Scott 
1979, 98). This is not least because the gap between popular ideas amongst a 
movement’s base and the strategizing calculus of its higher echelons can result in 
struggles over power and authority within armed groups (Scott 1979; Brenner 2017).  
To be sure, understanding “why men rebel” has been a central concern of 
Conflict and Security Studies since Tedd Gurr’s elaboration on the concept of relative 
deprivation (Gurr 1971). Similar to the study of rebel elites, the bulk of this scholarship, 
however, remains rooted in an understanding of human beings as strategizing and self-
propelled agents that base their presumably rational decisions on the careful weighing 
of costs and benefits. This ignores the workings of power structures and reiterates the 
reductionist binaries of earlier aggregate studies, for instance by classifying non-state 
combatants as either loot-seeking criminals or justice-seeking true believers (e.g. 
Weinstein 2006; Oppenheim et al. 2015). What gets lost in the commitment to 
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methodological individualism is the social context within which political violence 
takes place (for good critiques see Cramer 2002; Reno 2009). 
In contrast, this article contends that rebel groups do not emerge in a social 
vacuum. Neither do rebels act in one. In so doing, the following analysis builds on and 
contributes to recent analyses of war-time political orders (Mampilly 2011; Staniland 
2012; Arjona 2014). While civil wars have often been viewed as a breakdown of order, 
this burgeoning corpus of literature convincingly argues that armed conflict gives rise 
to alternative forms of political and social orders. Studies on rebel governance, for 
instance, show that revolutionary groups often commit considerable resources to 
govern civilians living in the areas under their control (e.g. Mampilly 2011; Arjona et 
al. 2015). They do so to address a key challenge that rebels face in their competition 
against the state: how to build stable support networks within wider society. To meet 
this challenge, pure coercion is not sufficient. Far from it, successful revolutionary 
movements rely on legitimate authority relations with local communities. In other 
words, they need to create a willingness amongst civilians to obey and submit 
themselves to rebel rule (cf. also Kalyvas 2006, 115).  
In order to build and maintain legitimacy, rebel groups thus engage in the 
provision of public services, including security, health, education and food (Mampilly 
2011; Arjona et al. 2015). In the Syrian civil war, for instance, warring factions have 
engaged in subsidized bread distribution to garner support from local communities 
(Martinez and Eng 2017). That said, rebel governance entails more than mere material 
exchanges. In fact, rebel groups deploy symbolic performances - including anthems, 
flags, uniforms or parades – in a mimicry of statehood and sovereignty (Mampilly 
2015; Martinez and Eng 2017). In doing so, they decrease the need to use violence and 
coercion. This is because the iterative symbolic enactment of alternative political 
orders in everyday settings can increase mass identification with revolutionary 
movements in the same fashion as symbolic performances can create feelings of 
belonging to nation-states (cf. also Wedeen 2009; Förster 2012). In both settings - state 
and non-state - symbolic repertoires are key to the making of political subjects.  
While political scientists have highlighted how rebels deploy symbolic 
repertoires as a means to gain hegemony within the public discourse, the ways in 
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which such symbolic performances create rebel subjectivities and rebel political culture 
remain underexplored. Sociological approaches to rebel governance are particularly 
helpful for uncovering such intersubjective processes that connect the individual to the 
collective (Förster 2012, 2013; Hoffmann 2015; Brenner 2017). A sociological 
understanding focuses on analyzing how rebel governance interacts with pre-existing 
social orders, including values, beliefs, and practices. In doing so, it highlights that 
political narratives deployed by rebel groups are not only propaganda-style 
smokescreens meant to manipulate the civilian audience. Revolutionary discourse can 
in fact become part and parcel of the social imaginary within which communal 
identities and everyday life play out, including the normative expectations of how 
people should live together (Förster 2012, 5). In turn, sociological analyses help to 
uncover how the interaction between rebels and society at large also creates pressures 
on rebel groups to the extent that it forms a moral economy - i.e. regulatory power 
structures surrounding socio-political values and beliefs – which constraints the actions 
of rebels and their leaders (Hoffmann 2015, 160-161).  
Analyzing the co-production of war-time political orders from a sociological 
perspective, thus, highlights the agency of non-elites vis-à-vis elite actors. In some 
cases, this can even take the form of civil resistance against rebel rule. This is 
particularly likely when armed groups attempt to enforce intrusive social interventions 
that collide with preexisting social institutions (Staniland 2014; Arjona 2015; 
Hoffmann 2015). In his 2014 film Timbuktu, Abderrahmane Sissako suggests that this 
is precisely what happened in 2012 when a foreign jihadist movement captured the 
titular ancient Malian city and imposed Sharia law. Appalled by the destruction of 
cultural heritage and oppression of diverse local customs, the citizens of Timbuktu 
engaged in everyday acts of resistance, including the then-forbidden act of playing 
music. It thus seems that in order to build legitimate and stable forms of governance, 
non-state armed groups need to work with the social grain and incorporate local 
institutions, including their underlying values, beliefs and practices. In other words, a 
sociological understanding of war-time political orders highlights the reciprocity of 
power between rebel groups and local communities. While conflict-affected societies 
6 
 
can be shaped by revolutionary discourse, social forces can shape rebel movements in 
return.  
Building on these insights, this article shows that the grassroots of rebellion, 
including rank-and-file soldiers and civilian supporters such as local youth, cannot be 
conceptualized as un-agential masses. It argues that understanding their aspirations 
and actions is indeed key for analyzing dynamics of political violence because they 
drive the collective trajectories of rebel movements by shaping revolutionary discourse. 
Because popular aspirations themselves are rooted within everyday social contexts, 
revolutionary discourse cannot be separated from wider society. Structure and agency 
both matter in the study rebellion. To appreciate this ontological embeddedness of 
rebel groups within particular socio-temporal contexts, relational sociology is 
particularly useful (cf. Schlichte 2009). Importantly, a relational understanding helps 
to conceptualize the ways in which non-elite members and supporters of rebellion 
drive collective processes. This is primarily because self-contained non-social actors, 
whose interests emerge from within themselves, do not exist in relational thinking. 
Borrowing from Norbert Elias, individual rebels, commanders, foot soldiers, and 
supporters within wider society alike “exist, one might venture to say only as 
pluralities, only in figurations” (Elias 1994, 213–14).  
From this perspective, the social orders of non-state armed groups are made up 
of intertwined structures and processes, encompassing interdependent and interacting 
actors whose identity, cognition, and behaviour are mutually contingent (Elias 1978, 
103). As in society more generally, these interdependencies stem from “everyone’s 
fundamental directedness to other people” (Elias 1978, 136). Similar to other social 
figurations, including families or nation-states, figurational interdependencies in rebel 
settings then stabilise armed social orders despite suboptimal outcomes for some or 
even most members. This does not, however, preclude change. On the contrary, the 
change of one actor’s position entails multiple changes in other parts of a figuration 
along chains of interdependencies, which ultimately change the whole figuration (Elias 
1978, 133–44). Following Elias, this explains the frequently observable disconnect 
between human intentions and the wider trajectory of society: 
7 
 
“From the interweaving of countless individual interests and 
intentions – whether tending in the same direction or in divergent 
and hostile directions - something comes into being that was 
planned and intended by none of these individuals, yet has emerged 
nevertheless from their intentions and actions.” (Elias 1994, 389) 
In other words, social interactions between differently situated rebels and their social 
environment enfold a multiplicity of simultaneous but interlaced processes without 
clear causal primacies. They create a momentum of their own in driving wider 
processes of political violence. This figurational understanding of rebellion does not 
only argue against parsimonious theorizing of causal processes. At the same time, it 
also helps to redirect our gaze towards the social interdependencies that propel 
collective outcomes. Importantly, it highlights the reciprocal quality of power, 
suggesting that even in the case of non-state armed groups - where military hierarchies 
create stark power imbalances, power is not the sole property of elites. Insurgencies 
are, thus, better understood as sites of ongoing contestation between differently 
situated and empowered actors. In order to illuminate these contestations, we now 
turn to the aspirations and lifeworlds of ethnic minority youth in Myanmar’s rebellious 
borderlands by looking at a favorite pastime in war-torn Kachin State: karaoke.  
Karaoke as “Data” 
Rebel movements around the world utilize various art forms for political 
communication and mobilization. In the anti-colonial struggle of Mozambique, for 
instance, revolutionaries used poetry to forge a common identity and communicate a 
vision of what it is to be a Mozambican before the nation came into material existence 
(Honwana 1969). Similarly, the Taliban have drawn on Afghanistan’s rich culture of 
poetry to celebrate the country’s history of resistance to foreign occupation. Reflecting 
the everyday dreams and desires of young Taliban, their poems not only speak of 
nationalism, religion and bravery on the battlefield, but also about love and friendship 
(Van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012). The Maoists in Nepal used songs, dances and 
drama to mobilize the peasantry. Based on the understanding that changing Nepal’s 
caste-based feudal structures necessitates a cultural revolution, the Maoist cultural 
program was indeed central to the movement (Mottin 2010). In order to glimpse into 
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the aspirations of grassroots rebels and supporters of rebellion, analyzing revolutionary 
arts and performances seems particularly helpful.  
This is not only because little formal data exists on the grassroots level of 
clandestine rebel organizations. More importantly, revolutionary cultural artefacts 
present a treasure trove of “data” themselves. Echoing the growing interest in audio-
visual artefacts in International Relations, the following analysis shifts the focus 
consciously away from traditional sources of data, such as official documents and 
statistics, in order to scrutinize their “epistemological certainties” (Callahan 2015, 898; 
cf. also Bleiker 2001; Danchev and Lisle 2009; Hansen 2011). In fact, Visual 
International Politics points to what political ethnographer Cédric Jourde called the 
“limited repertoire of political objects” that students of politics and international 
relations normally engage with (Jourde 2009, 202). Following Jourde this can lead to 
cases where scholarship gropes in the dark without noticing, which is when “political 
scientists walk on their path, not realizing that they are surrounded by UPOs 
[unidentified political objects] that could be, and often are, politically significant for 
the actors involved in them, if not more significant than the political objects researchers 
have already ‘identified’” (Jourde 2009, 203).  
Visual International Politics helps to uncover these UPOs by analyzing audio-
visual political artefacts - such as visual arts, movies or photography. Focusing on their 
aesthetics allows for exploring politics beyond the evaluation of mere truth-claims. A 
post-positivist visual methodology as promulgated by Gillian Rose, indeed, disputes 
that there is an “essential truth lurking in each image awaiting discovery. […] 
Interpreting images is just that, interpretation” (Rose 2012, xviii). This, however, can 
open up new avenues of enquiry. William Callahan shows that critical interpretation 
of visual material can delve into an often overlooked emotional space that highlights 
the role of affect in the production of politics. In his words, a critical aesthetic 
methodology  
“seeks to shift critical focus from facts to feelings, from stable 
individual identity to multiple flows of encounter, from texts to 
nonlinear, nonlinguistic and nonrepresentational genres, and from 
abstract rational knowledge to embodied forms of knowledge. […] 
The critical aesthetic mode here is not about what symbols mean but 
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embodies what experiences ‘do’, and thus moves from ideology to 
affect.” (Callahan 2015, 898) 
For the meaningful interpretation of karaoke videos, this article follows Rose’s advice 
to ground “interpretations of visual materials in careful empirical research of the social 
circumstances in which they are embedded” (Rose 2012, xviii). It does so by 
combining visual enquiry with findings from ethnographically-informed field work in 
order to situate the analysis in the social context of the Kachin rebellion. The following 
engagement with the politics of karaoke argues that this critical mode of enquiry can 
challenge received wisdom about rebel propaganda, recruitment, and support as well 
as political violence more generally. In contrast to more conventional methods, an 
audio-visual ethnography looks beyond the ways in which rebels deploy symbolic 
repertoires as propaganda or the conditions of civilian acceptance or rejection of rebel 
propaganda. Instead it allows for analyzing intersubjective processes in which 
revolutionary aesthetics are performed and experienced. In doing so, it sheds light on 
the making of rebel political subjects and the ways in which they themselves coproduce 
rebel political culture, which in turn exerts figurational pressures on rebel movements 
by shaping revolutionary discourse.  
 This article emerged as part of a more extensive project on the social dynamics 
of ethnonational rebellion in Myanmar. Research entailed extensive field work in the 
borderlands between Myanmar, China and Thailand, during which I lived and 
travelled with differently situated elite and non-elite members and supporters of the 
Kachin and Karen insurgencies for about nine months in 2013 and 2014; and shorter 
follow-up field work in 2017. I gained access to both movements as a researcher who 
was interested (and sympathetic) to their cause. Upon my interlocutors’ requests, I also 
conveyed multiple seminars on issues surrounding international politics and research 
methods for low-ranking rebel officers and members of activist groups and 
humanitarian organizations. During my time with both movements I conducted more 
than 80 interviews with rebel leaders, rank-and-file members, activists, local 
authorities and businessmen. While these interviews were helpful in inquiring about 
the perspectives of a variety of actors, much of my understanding of the social 
dynamics and contexts of political violence is based on informal conversations and 
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observations rather than structured interviews. Regular karaoke evenings allowed for 
a particularly intimate insight into the aspirations and lifeworlds of young supporters 
of the Kachin rebellion. 
Performing the Kachin Rebellion  
The Kachin rebellion is one of the oldest and strongest rebel movements in Asia. 
Founded as the Independence Organization (KIO) in 1961, it demands greater 
autonomy from the central state and ethnic minority rights under a federal 
constitution. At the time of writing, its armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army 
(KIA), fields about 10,000 active troops and another 10,000 reservists (Myanmar 
Peace Monitor, 2017). The movement emerged as a result of militarized and violent 
identity formation during the colonial period and the Second World War in opposition 
to an ethnocratic post-independence state, which failed to guarantee autonomy rights 
for ethnic minorities. Decades of armed conflict and violence have entrenched ethnic 
divides and grievances since.2  
Revolutionary songs have been instrumental for mobilizing the Kachin 
rebellion since its inception. In fact, KIO singers have toured through villages to 
communicate their revolutionary program surrounding a Kachin homeland to local 
communities since the 1960s.3 More recently, old and new revolutionary Kachin songs 
have been produced as karaoke music videos. Similar to elsewhere in eastern Asia, 
karaoke is immensely popular in northern Myanmar’s Kachin State. Young people in 
particular visit karaoke bars in the evenings as a form of popular entertainment. Some 
of these bars feature an open stage where singers perform in front of a crowd. More 
commonly, however, a group of friends book a private room in which they sing for 
and with each other. The lyrics are projected onto the screen below the music video. 
In practice, however, the songs are usually well-known to both the singer and the 
audience and are often rehearsed at home before. In a light-hearted and often alcohol-
                                                 
2 For more background on the Kachin rebellion and Myanmar’s civil war see Smith (1999, pp. 27-100), 
Sadan (2013) and Brenner (2015). 
3 Interview with elderly Kachin singer in Myitkyina, January 2017.  
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infused climate, one or more singers volunteer to perform a song and seek to impress 
the others with their performance skills.  
Karaoke bars in Kachin State fulfil a variety of purposes, one of which, perhaps, 
is to provide a temporary escape from a rather conservative society. In karaoke bars 
young Kachin can, for instance, flirt in a playful way without the usual constraints 
imposed by the informal norms and practices of a matrilateral cross-cousin marriage-
based society that stringently regulates romantic relationships in everyday live.4 While 
this might be particularly striking in Kachin karaoke bars, it resembles the practice of 
karaoke in more liberal societies. As most popular music around the world first and 
foremost celebrates love and romance, “the connection between karaoke and romance 
is perhaps inevitable” (Brown 2014, 76). To be sure, karaoke bars in rebel-held towns 
of Kachin State play a large variety of generic popular love songs from various places, 
including Kachin State, other parts of Myanmar, and China. They also feature 
revolutionary titles of the Kachin rebellion. These do not necessarily need to be 
unromantic. Yet, singing rebel karaoke is more than just an act of romance. 
In fact, karaoke music videos have been instrumental in revitalizing the Kachin 
rebellion after years of organizational decay, which the movement experienced during 
a 17 years-long ceasefire which broke down in 2011. Against the odds, young KIA 
officers managed to remobilize the movement by recruiting a new generation of rebels 
from Kachin State’s disillusioned youth. Instrumental to their endeavor was the 
establishment of a youth wing, the so-called Education and Economic Development 
for Youth (EEDY). This organization was first set up in 2002 and started operating on 
a large scale in the mid-2000s. Its main mission was to recruit youth across Kachin 
State, particularly in government-controlled areas by targeting students in colleges and 
universities. Since then hundreds of youth travelled to KIA-controlled areas to 
participate in 45-day-long workshops, in which they learned about the ethnonational 
political agenda of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), the political wing 
                                                 
4 To be precise, this applies to many young Kachin in urban settings. However, karaoke bars are also 
frowned upon as sites of sin, involving prostitution and drugs. Many young women in particular refrain 
from singing in karaoke bars to avoid stigmatization. For more information on Kachin matrilateral 
cross-cousin lineage see Leach (1951). 
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and parent organization of the KIA, and receive basic training in guerrilla warfare 
(Brenner 2015).5  
To organize this, the young KIA officers sought help from various 
professionals. One of the EEDY co-founders was originally approached for his media 
expertise as a journalist. Willing to help, he took the lead in modernizing the 
movement’s media and propaganda efforts behind rebel-held lines and established the 
aforementioned rebel-operated Laiza TV station. In their effort to reach out to Kachin 
youth in government-held areas of Kachin State, the modernized department set out 
to remake old revolutionary songs into karaoke-style music clips, featuring scrolling 
subtitles that help viewers to sing along. While the songs maintained their decades-old 
lyrics, their visuals and audio came to resemble contemporary Asian music videos 
popular in China, Japan, and South Korea.  
One well-known revolutionary classic that the KIA refurbished is called 
“Shanglawt Sumtsaw Ga Leh” - which means “The Love for the Revolution”.6 Its 
lyrics (written in the 1970s) are about courageous KIA soldiers calling on beautiful 
young Kachin women to marry them after graduating from high schools and colleges. 
According to the song, this provides a way for everyone to support the revolution. 
Moreover, the verses promise economic safety, physical security and comradeship, 
upon joining the revolution or marrying into it. One verse, for instance, sings about 
the commanding officer who will share his soldier’s food rations with the soldiers’ 
wives as well. While the lyrics are somewhat outdated in the 21st century, the visual 
depictions appeal to the desires among many of today’s Kachin urban youth. Besides 
featuring Kachin nationalist and revolutionary symbols - including dashing uniforms, 
minority costumes, and a traditional Manau ceremonial ground - large parts of the 
video call to mind modern pop/rock clips that feature Asian boybands. The KIA 
soldiers are portrayed as handsome and well-off young men, pictured leaning against 
an expensive car, and singing and playing their guitars dressed in modern jeans, shirts 
                                                 
5 The EEDY has ceased to exist since it was upgraded to a two year “national service” in 2016.  
6 +3Plusthree: “Shanglawt Sumtsaw Ga Leh”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cRpUq8ozgcw, 
last accessed 07 July 2017. 
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and sunglasses. The girls in the video wear make-up and fashionable clothes whilst 
gazing longingly from the balcony of a luxurious building. 
The idyllic modernity and heroic lyrics of the video stand in stark contrast to 
the depressed reality of urban Kachin youth, which is often characterized by rampant 
drug abuse and widespread disillusionment about the dire state of the local economy. 
Young Kachin grew up after the 1994 ceasefire and have not experienced previous 
round of war. Given their scarcity of options it seems predictable that they were 
susceptible to the promise of an end to injustice, improved security, and better 
economic opportunities through revolution. Against this background, it might seem as 
if rebel karaoke simply constitutes an instrumental recruitment tool that brainwashes 
desperate youth into rebel soldiers. Indeed, rebel leaders have employed karaoke music 
videos strategically to recruit new members to the rebellion. Although leaders have 
attempted to use karaoke in this way, the following discussion will show that many 
young Kachin are not simply passive propaganda consumers who are brainwashed 
into becoming revolutionaries. In fact, they actively engage with this medium in ways 
that not only shape their own rebel identities but also coproduce rebel political culture.  
Rebel Subjectivities  
During fieldwork in Laiza, the capital of the Kachin rebellion at the Chinese-Myanmar 
border, I befriended a group of young Kachin. Some of them were working in 
community-based organizations, which provided humanitarian aid in the camps for 
the tens of thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs). Some were activists, 
journalists, teachers, or nurses. While most were not part of the “rebellion-proper”, 
they can be located within the wider social figuration of the Kachin rebellion. Others 
were working in the administrative departments of the rebel quasi-state built by the 
KIO in their “liberated” pockets of territory. None of these young women and men 
matched the archetypal gun-toting rebel of the Western imaginary.  
The group was very sociable and often invited me to join them for dinner, 
picnics along the river banks and birthday parties. One evening we went to celebrate 
in one of the town’s karaoke bars. We booked ourselves a small room and ordered two 
crates of Chinese “Snow” beer. The room was lit by a spinning mirror ball and 
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absorbed by an oversized flat-screen TV, two pink sofas and a large computer terminal: 
the karaoke machine. One of my friends, Naw, booted the machine. He was a stocky 
young man in his late 20s who worked as a secretary for the Economics Department 
of the KIO and spoke fluent Chinese. He was an intelligent, quiet and somewhat shy 
person. In the Karaoke room he confidently grabbed the microphone and chose a 
Chinese love song from the seemingly endless list of foreign and domestic tracks. With 
the onset of the catchy pop-rock tunes, he looked firmly into the expectant eyes of his 
audience and started to sing passionately while shaking his body to the beat. In an 
instant, secretary Naw transformed into a rock star.  
Next on stage was Za Mi, who coordinated the outreach work of a local 
environmental organization and was known for her retro-styled electric scooter whose 
paintwork featured a large Union Jack. In her early thirties, Za Mi was a gifted and 
well-trained singer. Performing several songs by Celine Dion, Rihanna and Lady 
Gaga, she stunned her audience not only with her skilled vocals but also by changing 
from one character into another. As the evening progressed, Chinese and American 
music videos were gradually over-taken by local productions. In place of the glossy 
depictions of the world’s metropolises and professional dance crews, the karaoke TV 
now screened green Kachin hills, the Mali and N’Mai river banks, traditional Manau 
festival grounds, popular coffee shops in the government-held provincial capital of 
Myitkyina, and young Kachin couples holding hands.  
While some of these videos celebrated love, romance, and belonging, many 
others would cut away from the idyllic scenes to clips of violence, war and suffering. 
Kachin karaoke videos include shots of military training in rebel camps, clashes with 
government forces, Kachin civilians fleeing their homes, and their suffering in IDP 
camps. Some were documentary recordings, while others were scripted stories. The 
latter involved staged battles where Kachin actors, dressed up as government soldiers, 
pillaged and destroyed Kachin villages. Some combined this with a screen-play 
surrounding patriotic young men braving the harsh conditions of war while dreaming 
of their loved ones at home.7 My friends, who had just performed to popular music 
                                                 
7 Cf. for instance Aurali: “Sak Jaw Salum”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWNHkGcST2w, 
last accessed 7 July 2017. 
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from around the world, visibly changed their posture. While there were still one or two 
lead performers per song holding the microphones, the whole group joined into the 
songs with fierce passion. Despite their display of revolutionary rigor, their 
performance – by now infused with a good amount of the diminishing supply of beer, 
nevertheless, remained both playful and cheerful. In this night, my friends taught me 
how to sport an air guitar while chanting revolutionary slogans.  
Despite their own first-hand experiences of armed conflict, the everyday life of 
young Kachin in Laiza is rather removed from the experiences of Kachin rebel soldiers 
that are dug into muddy trenches of strategic hilltop positions. Singing revolutionary 
songs in the karaoke bar, however, provides urban youth for a way to perform rebellion 
and revolutionary identities. While my friends sang popular America and Chinese 
songs with great enthusiasm in one moment, they transformed into rebel soldiers when 
singing revolutionary songs in another. Enacting the suffering and bravery as depicted 
on the karaoke screen in a colorfully-lit room with pink sofas might not seem like the 
most authentic representation of the experiences of frontline soldiers. This 
notwithstanding, the performance of revolutionary songs in karaoke bars provides 
intimate insights into the formation of rebel identities among many young Kachin 
precisely because of its performative aspect. As per Judith Butler, this is because 
subjectivities are foremost created by way of reiterated acting, a process that produces 
stable identity categories that override inherent inconsistencies (Butler 1993). 
Importantly, however, Butler’s work on performativity also reminds us that identity-
creating performances are not simply the expression of freely wielded agency. In 
contrast to scholarship on performativity that highlights intentionality on the part of 
the performer (e.g. Goffman 1959; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011), Butler emphasizes that 
performances always work within powerful discursive structures (Butler 1993, 2010; 
cf. Häkli at al. 2017). From her perspective, performativity is at least as much about 
regulatory power and habitual practices that reaffirm ascribed identities and societal 
norms as it is about conscious attempts to challenge them.  
Karaoke performances offer a particularly revealing illustration of Butler’s 
argument. This is because karaoke is inherently about role-playing. In fact, karaoke 
can be understood as the staging of certain imaginaries according to a screenplay. As 
16 
 
per Vincanne Adams, karaoke thus constitutes a “spectacle of scripted 
simulation” (Adams 1996, 510). Rather than delivering an authentic representation of 
the depicted world in a music video, the act of karaoke is a stage play mediated through 
the intersubjective interpretations of the performers and the audience. Exploring 
karaoke as an insight into the multi-cultural politics of modernity in Tibet’s capital of 
Lhasa, Adams, therefore, compares the practice to the idea of role-playing, writing 
that 
“[K]araoke is not acting, per se. It is a simulation concealing not a 
more authentic or truthful act but the absence of a real act. Karaoke 
takes as its reality principle the idea of role-playing, but creates a site 
where role-playing is itself satirized, revealing the simulated 
character of acting. Karaoke cannot reproduce an original 
performance, for the original in most cases refers not to the 
performance of the song (or its recording in a studio) but to the 
memories of that song's popularity held by each viewer; it is indexed 
in a multitude of subjective experiences. No one thing is being 
replicated; karaoke is thus not a representation but a simulacrum of 
a fixed and singular authenticity. This does not mean the 
performance is not real. On the contrary, it means that the 
simulation is the reality.” (Adams 1996, 511) 
Analogously, the performance of rebellion in karaoke bars should not be viewed as an 
authentic enactment but as a scripted simulation, mediated through subjective 
imaginaries. Despite the absence of a real act (in this case fighting as a rebel soldier), 
rebel karaoke, thus, provides a platform for Kachin youth to express their rebel 
identities, not as passive consumers of rebel propaganda but by way of role-playing a 
particular script. Echoing Elisabeth Wood’s findings from El Salvador, “insurgent 
identities” are tied to “pleasure in agency”, a positive affect linked to self-esteem. It is 
derived from the successful effectuation of intent aimed at “making history, and not 
just any history but a history [that is] perceived as more just” (Wood 2003, 235). Taking 
pleasure in asserting will and efficacy in the face of unjust political structures, indeed, 
seems to be a motivating factor in the case of many Kachin rebels and supporters of 
rebellion.  
The practice of revolutionary karaoke, i.e. the scripted simulation of rebellion, 
reveals that such rebel identities are not only at work when joining the rebel army 
(which in the worst case might result in one’s own death on the battlefield). This 
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certainly differentiates karaoke rebels from genuine rebel soldiers. As per Brown, 
“performers of karaoke are not concerned with changing the face of history. Karaoke 
performances are about process, not product” (Brown 2014, 80). This said, the 
medium of rebel karaoke seems to be particularly powerful in forming rebel identities 
among urban Kachin youth precisely because of its “‘anyone can do it’ ethos” (ibid.). 
Concomitantly, it creates powerful discursive structures of its own within which 
identity formation takes place. This was exemplified by the ways in youth performed 
revolutionary songs with a mix of fierce passion and uniform repetition.  
Importantly, however, the playful performance of rebellion in karaoke bars has 
highlighted that young Kachin are not simply the consumers of top-down rebel 
propaganda videos but actively engage with the medium. This can also be seen with 
more recent karaoke videos that are independently produced by young Kachin singers. 
By analyzing these, the following section suggests that the interaction of Kachin youth 
with rebel karaoke videos is not only forming their own rebel identities but also shapes 
the region’s rebel political culture at large. 
Rebel Political Culture 
Social lifeworlds in Myanmar’s borderlands are intrinsically tied to decades-long 
protracted armed conflict. In rebel-held areas of Kachin State, this has led to a situation 
where political violence is embodied to the extent that rebellion has become a “way of 
life” for local communities (Smith 1999, 88). The social context within which 
revolutionary music is produced and performed is, thus, characterized by a rebel 
political culture of its own. While political culture can be defined as “the set of 
attitudes, beliefs, and feelings about politics current in a nation at a given time”, the 
“rebel” qualifier hints towards a counter-culture, including the “pleasure in agency” 
concept as elaborated above (Almond and Powell 1978, 25). Rebel political culture, 
hence, surrounds “practices such as rituals and symbols, and beliefs concerning the 
feasibility of social change and the potential efficacy of the group’s collective efforts 
towards this change” (Wood 2003, 219).  
While revolutionary elites strategically attempt to craft a rebel political culture, 
as seen, for instance, in the Maoist cultural programs of Nepal, a relational perspective 
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suggests that social practices and beliefs are coproduced in various nodes of the rebel 
figuration. The independent production of revolutionary songs by young Kachin 
musicians who are not members of the “rebellion proper” best illustrates this process. 
Their self-produced music videos can be found on Kachin social networks on the 
internet. At first glance, many seem similar to the propaganda videos of the KIO. 
Traditional and modern tunes are often accompanied by videos or photography of 
varying qualities depicting the suffering of Kachin civilians. Some of them are 
professional productions. 
One good example is a video by Ah Tang, a young artist whom one Kachin 
friend referred to as the “guru” of singer-songwriters.8 One of his most popular songs 
goes by the title of “Share Shagan Nampan Lahkawng” [Two Heroic Flowers].9 It is 
dedicated to two female volunteer teachers who are widely believed to have been raped 
and murdered by government soldiers in Northern Shan State in January 2015. The 
incident sparked protests across Kachin State, not least because government 
investigators denied army responsibility (Weng 2015). Encapsulating this anger, Ah 
Tang’s music video went viral on social media platforms in the internet. It mostly 
features footage of the crowded funeral march/rally, which was organized by the 
Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) in Myitkyina for the two young teachers. It merges 
the symbols of the Kachin rebellion with symbols of Christianity, both of which had 
significant influences on the construction of modern Kachin identity and the region’s 
rebel political culture (Sadan 2013, 35, 381-82). Wearing a cap with KIO insignia, Ah 
Tang appeals to the Kachin public to fight their repressors in revenge for the dead 
women. His song goes:  
“It hurts a lot. Two heroic flowers who sacrificed their lives. Tears 
drop from everyone […] the two flowers had no opportunity to 
blossom. We will claim blood debt. All the people who love their 
country and serve their duties. Forward!!! …in harmonious 
manner… Fight, fight, fight!!! We will fight the enemy while holding 
up the winning flag… the unjust abusers will lose/fall…we will get 
                                                 
8 Online conversation on a social media platform with Kachin student, 15 January 2015. 
9 Ah Tang: “Share Shagan Nampan Lahkawng”,  




rid of the enemies…there will be no footprints of them …fight all 
the devils… we will win this unjust war. God is with us.”10 
Many independently produced songs like the above dovetail with the 
ethnonationalist agenda of the KIO. This is not least evidenced by the fact that they 
are broadcasted by Laiza TV. Yet singers such as Ah Tang also lodge their own claims 
and shape the public discourse in Kachin State, often by merging everyday grievances 
with issues of social justice and Kachin nationalism.11  
In an interview with three independent Kachin rock stars, it was interesting to 
learn that none of them wanted to become a political singer to begin with. Similar to 
many other young Kachin, all three started to play and sing music as part of youth 
groups in local churches. To them, producing music is foremost an expression of 
feelings and emotions, including love, joy and anger. Their first songs were thus about 
everyday desires that would resonate with many young people in other parts of the 
world.12 Due to their experiences of war and exploitation, their music soon became 
political. According to them, they can, in fact, not but be political in their music. One 
of them expressed this by reflecting on his band, stating that “we play political music 
not because we are interested in politics but because we want to express our feelings 
through songs.” In their opinion, their music’s appeal to emotions is also the reason 
why their political songs are popular among young and old Kachin. In the words of 
another rock star: “I express the feeling of Kachin people through music.”13 In doing 
so, the musicians are conscious about and proud of the mobilizing effect that their 
music has on wider Kachin society in general and young Kachin in particular. All 
three occasionally sing on KIO-organized concerts and on music DVDs that the 
movement produces to recruit youth.  
In spite of their ideological proximity to the Kachin rebellion, they insist on 
being independent artists, driven by their own agenda. One musician explained this 
with reference to a music video in which he wears a KIO uniform, stressing that he 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 One of the most popular Kachin songs for instance is “Mali Hka” by Blast, which is an environmental 
protest song against the planned damming of the Irrawaddy river (Mali Hka in Kachin), cf. Blast: “Mali 
Hka”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9H4G99XSUA, last accessed 10 July 2017. 
12 Interview with three Kachin musicians, January 2017. 
13 Interview with three Kachin musicians, January 2017.  
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only performed to be a revolutionary: “You might think that the character in the video 
was from the KIO because of the KIO uniform. But that was only acting. We singers 
sometimes wear KIO uniforms and act the life of KIO soldiers.” In fact, Kachin 
vocalists do not only reproduce propaganda emerging from the KIO but co-produce 
rebel political culture themselves. Importantly, their songs reflect concerns in wider 
Kachin society surrounding themes such as humanitarian suffering, social justice and 
environmental degradation. One Kachin vocalist explains that ‘we use music videos 
to express our own feelings that are shared by the whole community.’ Music thus 
becomes a medium for articulating shared concerns and collective political attitudes 
and beliefs, i.e. political culture. As these songs are mediated through a Kachin 
nationalist framework, they echo the rebellion’s ideological line. That said, they also 
impact on the Kachin rebellion by shaping the socio-political discourse within which 
the rebellion operates.  
Kachin songs have, for instance, been instrumental for merging 
environmentalism with Kachin ethno-nationalism. Many songs have not only 
reproduced a discursive nexus between imaginaries of pristine nature and the Kachin 
homeland, but also linked the struggle against environmental degradation with ethnic 
resistance. This environmental crisis indeed, is partially the result of the Kachin 
rebellion itself: during the Kachin ceasefire the KIO leadership was complicit in 
environmental destruction, as so-called “ceasefire capitalism” gave rise to the mutual 
exploitation of the region’s natural riches by Myanmar’s generals, Chinese 
businessmen and rebel elites (Woods 2011). Large-scale mineral mining and timber 
logging have since gravely impacted the livelihoods of local communities by 
contributing to soil degradation, land dispossession, and labor exploitation.  
Upstream of the Kachin State capital of Myitkyina, a Chinese mega-dam 
project at the Myitsone confluence of the Mali and N’mai Rivers has become a 
particularly important focal point for mobilizing ethnonational resistance against 
environmental destruction. While the now-suspended hydro-power project drew 
criticism from across Myanmar and beyond for its potential environmental impact, the 
Kachin public has come to view the dam as an existential threat to the survival of the 
Kachin society and nation (Kiik 2016, 380-81). The band Blast encapsulated this 
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feeling in their rock song Mali Hka [Mali River]. Released in 2007 - at a time of 
mounting resistance against the Myitsone dam construction - the song worked as a 
major rallying cry of the Kachin public. Its lyrics merge nationalism and 
environmentalism by expressing the deep felt anger towards “foreign” “self-interests” 
that are destroying the river that is seen as the Kachin “life-line”. It also calls for 
resistance, urging: “patriotic people, let us protect our precious treasure with all our 
might!”14 Since 2007, it has become one of the most popular Kachin songs and now 
enjoys cult status among young and old Kachin. 
My first encounter with the Mali Hka song was in a frontline camp of the KIA 
in 2014. A young officer played the song on his guitar on one of the long nights in the 
muddy trenches of a hill top position, defending the KIO capital of Laiza. According 
to him, it was only natural that the KIO mobilized against the Myitsone dam as the 
rebellion reflected the interests and concerns of the Kachin public.15 As a matter of fact, 
the KIO had silently condoned the construction of Chinese hydropower plants in 
Kachin State during most of the ceasefire years and even paid for the construction of 
two smaller dams. Nevertheless, against the background of mounting public pressure 
since 2007, the KIO started to oppose the Myitsone hydro-power project. Weeks 
before the Kachin ceasefire collapsed in 2011, KIO Chairman Lanyaw Zawng Hra 
wrote a public letter to China’s then-President Hu Jintao objecting the Myitsone 
project, warning that the KIO “would not be responsible for the Civil War if the War 
broke out because of this Hydro Power Plant Project” (KIO 2011).16  
This is not to suggest that a Kachin protest song single-handedly changed KIO 
policy. A relational understanding of rebellion, in fact, eschews such mono-causal 
explanations and points to the ways in which the strategies of rebel groups are the 
outcomes of social interdependencies that require dialectic analysis of wider social 
processes. In this sense, many young Kachin do not only shape their own subjectivties 
                                                 
14 Blast: “Mali Hka”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9H4G99XSUA, last accessed 30 October 
2017.  
15 Conversation with KIA officer, near Laiza, 20 March 2014. To remobilize the Kachin rebellion, 
young KIA officers have, in fact, established consultative councils since the mid-2000s. These councils 
enable representatives of local communities to voice their concerns directly to the KIO leadership 
(Brenner 2015; 2017). 
16 While the letter was the first time that the KIO voiced its resistance against the Myitsone dam publicly, 
many young KIA officers started to oppose the project as early as 2007.  
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by performing revolutionary music in karaoke bars. At the same time, young Kachin 
musicians have become important co-producers of the very rebel political culture 
within which the rebellion proper is embedded. Their music both reflects and acts as a 
driver of socio-political discourse that impacts on the wider trajectory of rebellion. It 
also shows that power is not the sole attribute of rebel leaders but lies dispersed within 
a rebel figuration where interdependencies and pressures create a momentum of their 
own in driving political violence. 
Conclusion  
This article argued that Conflict and Security Studies needs to pay greater attention to 
the hidden social dynamics of rebellion in order to explain wider instances of conflict 
and peace. This is because collective trajectories of rebel movements cannot be inferred 
from the strategic decision-making of supposedly self-propelled rebel elites. The article, 
therefore, looked to the politics of karaoke in the Kachin rebellion of Myanmar to 
uncover everyday aspirations and social lifeworlds of rebel grassroots. By focusing on 
rebel karaoke as a social practice, my audio-visual ethnography uncovered how 
revolutionary music can be more than top-down propaganda that converts un-agential 
masses into gun-toting rebel soldiers. Instead of passively consuming revolutionary 
music, many young Kachin actively and creatively engage with the medium by 
performing rebellion in karaoke bars and self-producing music in independent studios. 
These findings contributed to the study of rebel governance and the importance 
of symbolic repertoires in the interaction between rebel groups and their social 
environment. The article did so by shifting attention to the intersubjective processes 
behind the making of rebel identities and rebel political culture. Analyzing rebel 
subjectivities highlighted the performative aspect of social identity formation. In fact, 
revolutionary karaoke understood as the scripted simulation of rebellion offered a 
particularly revealing window into Butler’s theory of performativity. On the one hand, 
playful performances of rebellion provide a powerful vessel for creating rebel social 
identities by enabling youth to escape the marginality of their everyday lives and to 
derive pleasure in exercising agency against unjust domination and discrimination. On 
the other hand, revolutionary songs and their reiterated performances take place 
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within their own set of discursive structures, including predefined notions of Kachin 
nationalism. While revolutionary songs thus challenge societal norms and practices 
of, for instance, the ethnocratic political order of the state, they serve to create their 
own disciplinary and regulatory constraints.  
At the same time, analyzing the work of independent Kachin vocalists showed 
how many young Kachin actively engage with the socio-political underpinnings of 
ethnonational ideology themselves. In linking environmentalism with 
ethnonationalism, Kachin musicians have, for instance, not only mobilized social 
resistance against harmful mega-development projects. By giving voice to the concerns 
of ordinary Kachin, they also shaped the very discursive context within which the 
Kachin movement operates. This created pressures on rebel leaders to respond to calls 
for social justice, impacting the trajectory of rebellion itself. Revolutionary music, 
therefore, should not only be understood as a vehicle for creating social identities and 
mobilization. Equally important are the ways in which independent Kachin musicians 
coproduce rebel political culture. Karaoke and revolutionary music have, in fact, 
become important cultural sites of contestation themselves. From this perspective, 
revolutionary art forms can form an important part of a public sphere in contested and 
conflict-affected spaces. Understood as such, they offer a rare perspective into the 
popular aspirations underlying revolutionary movements and, thus, the little 
understood relationship between rebel elites and their own grassroots. 
Exploring these social dynamics of political violence highlighted the benefits of 
relational sociology as theory and audio-visual ethnography as method for 
understanding rebellion as ontologically embedded within a broader social context. 
More specifically, relational analysis revealed social interdependencies and reciprocal 
power relations between rebellion and society at large. It also showed how figurational 
pressures can drive collective processes of political violence in unforeseen ways. This 
challenges the elite-centric and rationalist orthodoxy in Conflict and Security Studies 
by highlighting the reciprocal and dispersed nature of power. In doing so, this article 
contributed to recent scholarship on non-elite agency in civil wars by showing how 
rebel subjectivities are formed and how this process coproduces rebel political culture, 
which in turn shapes revolutionary discourse. In addition, the article contributed to 
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the development of critical methods that can capture such intersubjective and 
performative processes. While formal data and conventional methods seem of limited 
use for developing a deeper understanding of these hidden social dynamics, using rebel 
karaoke as “data” and audio-visual ethnography as method demonstrated that 
alternative epistemic objects and critical modes of enquiry merit greater attention in 
the study of political violence. By merging audio-visual analysis with ethnography, this 
article also contributed to the visual turn in International Relations. Not only did the 
article move beyond the textual interpretation of revolutionary music. It also 
demonstrated the importance of developing a greater understanding of the ways in 
which revolutionary aesthetics are being performed and experienced, which suggests 
the need for further research on the powerful emotional space of rebel politics. 
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